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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
i

VS.

Case No.

20575

ONE (1) 1983 PONTIAC,
(JOE ARAVE),
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a decision of the District Court,
in and for Cache County, State of Utah, which denied forfeiture.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
and

Was Joe Arave the owner of the 1983 Pontiac in question

using said vehicle for the mere possession of cocaine and/or

the distribution of cocaine?
• 2.

Does

the

amount

of

cocaine have any bearing on Utah

Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)?
3.
father

Does
of

Zions

First

National

Bank

of Utah, and/or the

Joe Arave, have an equitable interest in said vehicle

that would prevent forfeiture of the vehicle?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4.
the

Should

State's

the

value

ability

to

of

have

said vehicle have any effect on
the vehicle forfeited under Utah

Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)?
5.

Did the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen abuse his discretion

in

failing to forfeit said vehicle based upon his interpretation

of

the

forfeiture Statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13

(1953 as amended)?
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The
of

Utah

lower
for

Court

heard argument on a Petition by the State

forfeiture of a 1983 Pontiac pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated 58-37-13 (1953 as amended).
dated

the

14th

Honorable

day

VeNoy

In a Memorandum Decision

of February, 1985, the District Judge, the

Christoffersen,

ruled

that the vehicle should

not be forfeited.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant

seeks

a

reversal

of the lower Court ruling and

the imposition of judgment declaring the vehicle forfeited.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

or

about

August

24, 1984, and on or about September

13, 1984, Joe Arave was involved in the distribution of a controlled
substance,

to-wit:

cocaine.

Scott

Crawford

and

Fred Olsen

acted as undercover narcotic agents.
On
of

or

cocaine

about
to

August 24, 1984, Joe Arave sold a half a gram

an undercover officer.

The controlled substance

was

transported

to the undercover officer's residence on August

25,

1984.

transportation was accomplished by One (1) 1983

The

Pontiac owned by Joe Arave.
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On
by

or

about

undercover

Joe

Arave

from
not

agents

went

the

to

Joe

13, 1984, Joe Arave was approached

concerning
his

interior

consummated

date,

September

of

distribution of cocaine.

vehicle and produced a gram of cocaine
the

One (1) 1983 Pontiac.

at this time.

Arave

the

The sale was

Later in the evening on the same

arrived at the under cover officer's residence

and produced approximately one gram of cocaine that was transported
within the One (1) 1983 Pontiac for final distribution.
Joe Arave received $50.00 on August 24, 1984, for the purchase
of

cocaine,

and

$75.00

on

September 13, 1984, for additional

cocaine.
The legal owner and title holder of the One (1) 1983 Pontiac
is

Joe

Arave.

The vehicle's owner owns an auto repair business

known

as

"J.C.'s

cars.

The automobiles that were purchased for repair were usually

financed

by

did

take

they

not

claim

payment
was

Paint and Body Work" which rebuilds and sells

Zions
a

First
security

National

NINETEEN

first

purchased

HUNDRED
for

The Bank, however,

interest in the 1983 Pontiac, nor do

an interest therein.

of

Bank.

Joe Aravefs father made a down

DOLLARS

repair.

($1,900.00) when the car

The

vehicle in question is

worth approximately TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00).
The
Decision
State,

Honorable
on
and

the
not

VeNoy

Christoffersen entered his Memorandum

14th day of February, 1985, ruling against the
allowing

forfeiture

of the Defendant vehicle.

On the 22nd day of February, 1985, further hearings were held
-3-
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dealing

with

procedural

problems

that

might arise during the

appeal period if the vehicle were returned to the owner.
The Appellant relies upon Section 58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated
(1953

as

vehicle

amended)

for

forfeiture

of said vehicle because the

facilitated the transportation of a controlled substance

known as cocaine on two occasions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

lower court abused its discretion in its interpretation

of

facts

pertaining

The

lower

courts

58-37-13
cocaine
The

(1953

to

cocaine

distribution

v. possession.

interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section

as

amended)

held

the

amount and value of the

dictated whether forfeiture of a vehicle is permissible.

lower

defendant

court

relied upon proposed equitable interest in the

vehicle

in

question

on

the

that

do not exist.

The value of the vehicle

was determined by the lower court to have a bearing

forfeiture

statute.

That

the

court misinterpretated

Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended); a statute
that is clear on its face.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAS JOE ARAVE THE OWNER OF THE
1983 PONTIAC IN QUESTION AND USING
SAID VEHICLE FOR THE MERE POSSESSION
OF COCAINE AND/OR FOR THE DISTRIBUTION
OF COCAINE.
The

trial

on

the

merits of Case No. 2341 was held on the

8th day of February, 1985. Starting with page 16, line 25,
-4-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on

the

Reporter's

conversation

between

of

August

him

where

he

coke

and

asked

and

Joe

was

going,

if

he

testimony

Arave

24, 1984, was:

I asked

said

transcript,

and

of

Scott Crawford's

Fred Olson on the evening

"When he was leaving, Mr. Olsen asked
and he said he was going to get some

wanted

any, and Mr. Olsen said we did,

him if it was $50.00 for a half a gram.

it was, so

Mr. Arave

I gave him the $50.00 and he left."

At 2:30

a.m. on the 25th of August, Joe Arave came back to Scott Crawford
residence and gave Scott a bindle of cocaine.
On

September

Crawford

and

Arave.
an

At

Fred

ball

an

eight

next week.

Olsen

once

again

came in contact with Joe

this time Fred Olsen asked if Joe Arave could obtain

eight

have

13, 1984, at DeLorean's Manufacturing, Scott

of

cocaine. Joe

Arave responded that he didn't

ball at this time, but he could possibly get one

Joe Arave then stated that he had a gram of cocaine

but would try to obtain another gram and come over to the officer
house.

(Reporter's Transcript, page 25, start with line 1).

The

officers

cocaine.
mately

anticipated

receiving

more

than

a gram of

(Reporter's Transcript, page 20, line 24). At approxi-

6:30

p.m.,

Joe

Arave

the officers' residence,
(Reporter's

delivered one gram of cocaine to

and the officers paid Joe Arave $75.00.

Transcript, page

21, starting with line 17 through

page 22).
The
Code

State

filed

criminal

charges, two counts, under Utah

Annotated Section 58-37-8.(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended) which

provides:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"(a) Except as authorized by this act, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
and intentionally:"
"(ii) to distribute for value a controlled
or counterfeit substance:"
Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance.
In

State

v. Taylor,

(1979)

599

P.2d 496 at 498 and 499,

the Defendant was charged with the crime of distributing a controlled
substance

for

value.

On

October

an

undercover

agent,

asked

the

of

heroin,

Defendant

and

the

convicted

Defendant

Defendant to get her two bags

the Defendant requested $5.00.
money

and the Defendant,

the controlled substance.
was

4, 1977, Stubbs, working as

took

$60.00

Stubbs gave the

in return, gave Stubbs

A second offense for which the Defendant

place on October 10, 1977.

for

two balloons of heroin.

Stubbs paid the
The main purpose

for the State v. Taylor, Supra, to be before the Supreme Court
was

for

facts

the

also

proper

courts
parallel

charge

should

determination of entrapment.
those
be

actions

However, the

of

Joe Arave and show the

distribution,

not merely possession.

See also State vs. Kourbelas, (1980) 621, P.2d 1238 and 1239.
It

is

very

user

as well.

fits

into

common

for

a

distributer of cocaine to be a

This is the case no matter where the distribution

the hierarchy of the distribution chain.

Most Judges

in a distribution case will also include a lesser included offense
of

possession

in

a jury instruction if reasonableness requires

it.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The appellant submits that the facts before the Honorable
Judge, as recited supra, indicate a proper charge of distribution
for

value.

Such

being

the

case, the forfeiture statute and

case law is clear that drugs being transported for distribution
purposes should result in having the vehicle so used being forfeited
to

the

State.

erroneous

in

The

lower

arriving

at

court ruling of mere possession was
its

determination of not forfeiting

the vehicle and should be reversed.
POINT II
DOES THE AMOUNT OF COCAINE HAVE
ANY BEARING ON UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 58-37-13 (1953, AS AMENDED)
In
and
is

a

the
half.

State

v.

case

at

The only Utah case dealing with vehicle forfeiture
One

(1) Porsche 2-Door, (1974) 526 P.2d 917, 918

and 921, where

the

marijuana

some

not

and

expressly

hand the quantity of cocaine was one gram

Court
other

stated.

was

concerned with a small amount of

kind

The

of

Supreme

pills; the exact amount is
Court

concerned with the issue of quantity but rather
was

only

did

not

In

charged
compare

with
with

of Utah was not as
that the Defendant

a Class B misdemeanor and that the fine
the enormity of a $10,000 vehicle value.

the present case, Joe Arave was charged with two third degree

felonies, both having possible prison sentences and/or $5,000.00
fines.
The
requiring

forfeiture statute itself does not contain any language
a

certain

quantity

of

drugs before forfeiture, nor

does the statute contain any language that the charge must be
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a

felony

before

forfeiture

becomes

of drugs transported is irrelevant.
Yacht

(1974)

Mercedes
Truck,

416

U.S. 663/

40

appropriate.

The amount

See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson

L.Ed. 2d 452, U.S. v. One 1975

280S, (1978) 590 F.2d 196, U.S. v. One 1975 Ford Pickup
(1977)

558

F.2d

755 and the recent case of U.S. v. One

(1) 1982 28' International Vessel, (1984) 741 F.2d 1319.
Appellant
the

Utah

the

quantity

being

respectfully

forfeiture

the

quantity

in

submits

that

under

case

law and

statute (58-37-13 U.C.A. 1953 as amended),

of

the

drug does not determine forfeiture.

case,

the

lower

arriving

at

court

its

Such

erred in reliance upon drug

determination

of not forfeiting

the vehicle.
POINT III
DOES
ZIONS
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF UTAH AND/OR THE FATHER OF JOE
ARAVE HAVE AN EQUITABLE INTEREST
IN SAID VEHICLE THAT WOULD PREVENT
FORFEITURE OF THE VEHICLE.
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (l)(e)(iii) states:
"Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to
a bona fide security to the interest of the
secured party upon the party's showing he
could not have known in the exercise of reasonable
diligence that a violation would take place
in the use of the conveyance."
•;. • The
that
Joe

Honorable

Zions
Arave

Judge

in his Memorandum Decision determined

Bank had an equitable interest in Defendant vehicle.
on

direct . examination,

(Page

30 of the Reporter's

Transcript), stated that he secured FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00)
for the purchase of the 1983 Pontiac, and TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DOLLARS

($2,500.00)

for

repairs.

Zions

Bank

did not take a

lien or a security interest in said vehicle (Page 31 of the
Reporter's Transcript).

Zions Bank had Joe Arave's father co-sign

to give the bank security (Pages 44 and 48 of Reporter's Transcript).

Zions

Bank

1983 Pontiac.
Joe

not

claim

a security interest in the

(Page 48 of the Reporter's Transcript).

Arave's

DOLLARS

does

father

($1,900.00)

issued

a

check

for NINETEEN HUNDRED

for the down payment on the 1983 Pontiac.

The reporter's transcript is void of any evidence that Joe Arave's
Father was paid back or that Joe's father could have known "...in
the
take

exercise
place

of
in

reasonable

diligence

that

a violation would

the use of the conveyance" involving the Pontiac

in the use of cocaine distribution.

(U.C.A. Section 58-37-13

(l)(e)(iii)).
Appellant

respectfully

submits

that the lower court erred

in finding that Zions Bank and Joe Arave's father had an equitable
interest

in

that

equitable

an

the

1983

Pontiac.

interest

Assuming for arguendo purposes

is present, that interest could be

compensated upon forfeiture of the vehicle.
POINT IV
SHOULD THE VALUE OF SAID VEHICLE
HAVE
ANY EFFECT ON THE STATE'S
ABILITY TO HAVE THE VEHICLE FORFEITED
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION
58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED).
In
amount

the
of

Court's
forfeiture

made of the vehicle."

Memorandum

Decision it was held that "the

appears to be disproportionate to the use
The Court further stated that it feels

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law -9Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"this is not a situation the legislature had in mind to discourage
the illegal transportation of contraband."

Value of the 1983

Pontiac was estimated at TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00).
Appellant
upon

its

respectfully

face,

and

that

submits
the

that

the Statute is clear

intent of the legislature would

dictate the forfeiture of said vehicle based upon the facts.

does

Utah

Code

Annotated

not

make

any

Section

mandates

as

58-37-13

(1953

as amended)

to value of the vehicle.

relevant portions of the code state:
"(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture
and no property right shall exist in them:
(a)
All controlled substances which
have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed
or acquired in violation of this act;
(b)
All raw materials, products, and
equipment of any kind used, or intended for
use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting and controlled
substance in violation of this act;
(c)
All property used or intended for
use as a container for property described
in subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) of this
section;
(d)
All conveyances including aircraft,
vehicles of vessels used or intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession,
or concealment of property described in (l)(a)
or (l)(b) of this section, except that:
(i)
No conveyance used by any
person as a common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier shall be
forfeited under this section unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge
of the conveyance was a consenting party
or privy to violation of this act; and
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The

(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited
under this section by reason of any act or
omission established by the owner to have
been committed or omitted without his knowledge
or consent; and
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance
subject to a bona fide security interest
shall be subject to the interest of the secured
party upon the party's showing he could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable
diligence that a violation would take place
in the use of the conveyance.
(f)
All books, records, and research,
including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and
data used or intended for use, in violation
of this act."
The
not

Code

is

concerned

with

to forfeiture.
sale,

or

clear and not ambiguous. The legislature was
the

value

of

the vehicle that is subject

If the vehicle participated in the transportation,

possession

of

a controlled substance, the vehicle is

subject to forfeiture.
The facts before the lower court not only indicate possession
of

cocaine,

but

also

trafficking of cocaine with the intent

to distribute the same for value.
Appellant
Section
that

respectfully

58-37-13

the

lower

(1953
court

considering

whether

legislature

is

submits

that

Utah

Code Annotated

as amended) is clear upon its face, and
erred

in

forfeiture

taking the vehicle's value in

was

proper. The intent of the

clear, based upon the facts in the case at hand

the 1983 Pontiac should be forfeited.

-11-
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POINT V
DID THE HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN
ABUSE
HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO FORFEIT SAID VEHICLE BASED UPON
HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FORFEITURE
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED)a
In the drafting of U.C.A. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)
the

legislature

The

exemptions

included
in

the

certain
forfeited

58-37-13(1)(e)(i) through (iii).

exemptions

for

forfeiture.

section are found in Section

They read as follows:

"(i) No conveyance used by any person
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited
under this section unless it appears that
the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance was a consenting party or privy
to violation of this act; and
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited
omission established by the owner to have
been committed or omitted without his knowledge
or consent; and
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance
subject to a bona fide security interest
shall be subject to the interest of the secured
party upon the party's showing he could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable
diligence that a violation would take place
in the use of the conveyance."
The

legislature

has

not

included exceptions for quantity

of the controlled substance transported, the value of the controlled
substance

in

comparison

with the worth of the vehicle, nor the

value of the vehicle to be forfeited.

The exemption in subsection

(iii) supra only allows, after a showing of a bona fide security
-12-
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interest

has

been

shown

by

the secured party, that the party

would be entitled to compensation.
In
879,

the

the

case

Supreme

of

It would not prevent forfeiture.

State v. Chambers, (1975) 533 P.2d 876 at

Court

held that "if discretion is reasonably

used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious,
the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed."
facts

and

indicate

the
that

applicable
the

1983

statute
Pontiac

The

in the present case clearly
should

have

been forfeited.

When the court takes it upon itself to add exceptions to a statute
that

is

with

the

manner.
a

clear

upon

its

face, and make findings inconsistent

facts then it is acting in an arbitrary and capricious
The standards and/or elements become so arbitrary that

reasonable

person

is

unable to make a determination whether

forfeiture is ever applicable.
The appellant would submit that the Statute (58-37-13 U.C.A.
1953

as

Supreme

amended)
Court

is

held

plain and its meaning is clear. The Utah
in

In

re

Stevens Estate, (1942) 130 P.2d

85 at 86 and 87 that:
"This court will not read into this statute
by judicial legislation the words 'or has
some interest, direct or indirect.1
The
language of the statute is plain and its
meaning is clear, in which case there is
no occasion to search for its meaning beyond
the statute itself."
Jurisdictions
Section

58-37-13

with
(1953

statutes similar to Utah Code Annotated
as

amended) would have held in similar

fact situations that the vehicle should have been forfeited.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Only a small number of states allow forfeiture for mere possession.
See

Matter

of

1972 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, (1977) 573 P.2d 535,

State

v. One

Certain

State

v. One

1970

N.W. 2d
for

849.

Conveyance,

2-Door

Virtually

distribution

Sedan
all

is

211

N.W.2d

297 and

Rambler (Gremlin), (1974) 215

states, however, allow forfeiture

when the act results in a felony charge and/or

a possible fine of up to $5,000.00.
Arave

(1973)

charged

with

three

In the present case Joe

felony distribution charges, two

of which deal with the 1983 Pontiac directly.
In
(1979)
One

the
591

matter
P.2d

Porsche

Court

569

2-Door,

intended

possession,

of

One
at

1965

572,

supra,

that

the

Ford Econoline Van v. State,

the Arizona Supreme Court cited

at

919, and that the Utah Supreme

forfeiture

statute

did not apply to

but was "directed exclusively toward the transportation

of a controlled substance for distribution according to erstwhile
law

merchant

principles,

consumption."
bution

and

not

for personal possession and

The facts before the Court clearly indicate distri-

for value, and clearly fall within the legislative intent

of the Utah Statute (U.C.A. Section 58-37-13, 1953 as amended).
In

light

of

the

above

reasoning, appellant respectfully

submits that the lower court abused its discretion in its interpretation of the facts and how the facts should apply to U.C.A.
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended).
legislative

intent

in

its

And that the Court misconstrued

interpretation

of

on its face.
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a statute clear

CONCLUSION
Appellant
Section
that

respectfully

58-37-13

the

court

1983 Pontiac.

(1953

submits

that

Utah

Code Annotated

as amended) is clear upon its face, and

abused its discretion in failing to forfeit the

For this reason, and the others heretofore presented/

appellant respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court
reverse

the

judgment of the lower court and declare the vehicle

in question forfeited.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

^2a,A^

JEFJ
DepuJfctf] O&che County A t t o r n e y
fbrnftuk
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l of

the

Staft£/of Utah
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
State of Utah
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies
Attorney

of

the
for

foregoing
Defendant,

Brief
at

2568

of Appellant to John T. Caine,
Washington Boulevard, Ogden,

Utah, 84401.

JUN 7W*

"R" BURBANK
ache County Attorney
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-15Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^h

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff

)

v.

)

1983 PONTIAC,

Civil No.

23241

* v
Defendant

The State has filed their complaint alleging the 1983 Pontiac
was used in the transportation of controlled substance and
therefore should be forfeited to the State. The 19 83 Pontiac
Firebird had a value of approximately $10,000.00.

It sometimes

seems a little bit odd, that generally the cars* involved as far
as the State seeking a forfeiture, involve $10,000.00 Pontiacs
or Porsches, or $15,000.00 Transams, but no $250.00 1970 Chevs.
In this case, there are four issues raised.

One is jurisdiction

since this matter was not set for trial as prescribed by 5 8-36-13
(g).

This provides where an answer to a complaint is filed* the

Court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days*
not accomplished.

This was

This may be jurisdictional, the Court does not

hold so since the Court must have some control over its own calendar
and this may be an impossibility.

But, even so, it is a noncompliance

with that paragraph.
The car was used to transport on one occasion a gram of cocaine.
The defendant states he was going to get some for his own use and
ask what turned out to be an undercover agent, if he wanted him to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

bring him some back Machine-generated
to. The OCR,
undercover
This was
may contain errors. agent said yes.

accomplished and at a later time the undercover agent approached
the owner of the defendant vehicle and asked him to drop off
another gram.

This he did.

There is no indication there was

any profit motive in any cf the transportation of contraband
that no doubt was in the possession of the owner of the Pontiac.
It is questionable whether it was for sale/.but merely possession
of his own and possession to turn it over to'who he thought was
his friend.

Technically, it appears there was a transportation.

There is also a question of an equitable interest in the car
by others than Mr. Arava, who is the defendant in the criminal
aspect of this case.

Since he has been in the business of buying car

and fixing them for resale, and for the last two and one-half
years has had an arrangement with Zion's Bank wherein they would
loan him the money, on his Dad's guarantee, to buy the cars and
sufficient monies to get the parts, repair them, so that he could
re-sell them.

True, they did not take in this case the registration

or title as security, but this has been a procedure they have been
following for the past two and one-half years with the bank
furnishing the money for the purchse and repair of the vehicle.
If the car is forfeited, the person who, under these circumstances,
is penalized is not the defendant in the criminal case, but rather
either his father or the bank.

The amount of forfeiture appears

to be disproportionate to the use made of the vehicle.
Taking all four of these things into consideration, the
jurisdiction, the use of the car, the equitable interest in the
car by either the father or the bank since the loan was for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
$6,500.00,
and looking
at the
auestion
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors. nf uhn ~~*-~

i.---*

the Court feels that this is not a situation the legislature
had in mind to discourage the illegal transportation of contraband.
Therefore/ the Court dismiss1 the complaint of forfeiture by
the State.

The property to be returned back to the owner.

Dated this

/1<\

day of February,/1985.

Istoffersen
Judge
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58-37-13

REGISTRATION DIVISION

58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure. (1) The
following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them:
(a) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act;
(b) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act;
(c) All property used or intended for use as a container for property described
in subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b) of this section;
(d) All hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not to include
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use
to administer controlled substances in violation of this act;
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels used or intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in (1) (a) or (1) (b) of this section,
except that:
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under this section unless it
appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation of this act; and
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this section by reason of any act
or omission established by the owner to have been committed or omitted without
his knowledge or consent; and
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest shall
be subject to the interest of the secured party upon the party's showing he could
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take
place in the use of the conveyance.
(f) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and
data used or intended for use, in violation of this act.
(g) Everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for
a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended
to be used to facilitate any violation of this act; however, no property shall be forfeited under this subsection, to the extent of the interest of the owner, by reason
of any act or omission established by him to have been committed, or omitted without his knowledge or consent. There is a rebuttable presumption that all money,
coins, and currency found in close proximity to forfeitable controlled substances,
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the^
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are forfeitable
under this section. The burden of proof shall be upon claimants of the property
to rebut this presumption.
(h) Ail imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled
Substances Act.
(2) Any property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the
property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or
an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment
in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this
act;
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly
or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been
used or intended to be used in violation of this act.
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-13

(3) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, proceedings
under subsection (4) of this section shall be instituted promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable but
shall be deemed to be in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure
subject only to the orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. Whenever property is seized under the provisions of this act the appropriate
person or agency may:
(a) Place the property under seal;
(b) Remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under which
it was seized;
(c) Take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for
disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act shall be deemed contraband
and seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances listed
in schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state shall be
deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are
unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in schedules I and
II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, may be seized
and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its duly authorized agent, of
any person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that
he is the holder of a license, shall constitute authority for the seizure and forfeiture
of the plants.
(8) Whenever any property, including motor vehicles and other conveyances, is
forfeited pursuant to this act by a finding of the court that no person is entitled
to recover such property, the property, if a motor vehicle or other conveyance, shall
be deposited in the custody of the department of finance. Property other than motor
vehicles and conveyances shall be deposited with the department. Disposition of
all property shail be as follows:
(a) Any state agency, bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a
need for specific property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall make
application for such property to the director of the department of finance, in cases
involving motor vehicles and conveyances, or the department, in cases of other
property, and shall clearly set forth in the application his or its need for the property and the use to which the property will be put.
(b) The director of the department of finance or business regulation shall review
all applications for property submitted pursuant to subsection (8) (a) of this section
and make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition
and shall so notify the designated applicant who may obtain the property upon
payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The department of finance or
business regulation shall in turn reimburse the seizing agency or agencies for costs
expended in seizing, storing, and obtaining forfeiture of said property.
(c) If no disposition is made upon an application under subsection (8) (a) of this
section, the director of the department of finance or business regulation shall dispose of the property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate by the director
of the department having charge of the property, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having
charge of the property verified by the director of the department or his designated
agent.
(9) Whenever any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture to the state shall be made in the following manner:
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REGISTRATION DIVISION

(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the county
attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed in the district
court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) The property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) The date and place of seizure, if known;
(iii) The allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith
issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject matter of the action
and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the property has previously been
seized without a warrant, pursuant to section 58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county
clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all persons known
to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by one of the following
methods:
(i) Upon each claimant whose name and address is known at the last known
address of the claimant; or
(ii) Upon each owner whose right, title or interest is of record in the motor
vehicle division, by mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by registered mail
to the address given upon the records of the motor vehicle division; and
(iii) Upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are
believed to have an interest in the property, by one publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county where the seizure was made.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (8) (e) of this section any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within
twenty days after service has been obtained.
(e) Whenever property is seized pursuant to this act, any interested person or
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under this section,
may file a petition in the district court for release of his interest in the property.
The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney in the county
of the seizure who shall answer the petition within twenty days. Any person petitioning shall not be required to answer a complaint of forfeiture.
(f) After twenty days following service of a complaint or petition for release,
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow
the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his
claim and order forfeiture or release of the property as the court may determine.
If the county attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the
court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery
of the property it shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the
petition writhin ten days, and if no answer is filed within that period, the court
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) Whenever an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of twenty days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within twenty uays
at which all interested parties may present evidence of their right of release of
the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine
by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or
release of the property as it shall determine.
(h) Proceedings of this section shall be independent of any other proceedings,
-whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state.
(i) Whenever the court determines that claimants have no right in the property
in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited and direct it to
be delivered to the custody of the department of finance, in cases involving motor
vehicles or conveyances, or to the department of business regulation in other cases,
and such department shall dispose of the property as provided in subsection (8)
of this section.
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(j) Whenever the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper claimant.
If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in
part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. When the property cannot
be properly divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall order it sold
and the proceeds distributed as follows:
(i) First, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) Second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the
property, and costs of sale, and
(iii) Third, to the department of finance for the state general fund.
(k) In any proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in whole
or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including
seizure and storage of the property, against the individual or individuals whose
conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may assess costs against any other
claimant or claimants to the property as the court deems just.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch.
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9.
j~
, VA, „
:l
Compiler s Notes.
,nn„
.
,
,
,.
m.
The 1982 amendment by chapter 12
inserted subd. (l}(g)
Tne 1982 amendment by chapter 32
inserted subd. (l)(h).
Purpose of statute.
Since primary purpose of statute is prevention of transportation of controlled substances to accomplish possession, and not
prevention of personal possession and con-

sumption, forfeiture provision of subd. (l-)(e)
did not apply to student arrested for driving
under influence of alcohol who was found in
•
*
c
en. .
possession of one ounce of marijuana. State
v Q n e P o r s c h e 2 _ Door% L D N o 9 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 6 f
T i U e N o p p 1()026F B e a r i
Kansag Licenge
p i a t e No. JOR 1652(1974)526 P 2d 917.
Law

Reviews,
Comment, State v. One (1) Porsche 2-Door:
A Judicial Standard for Forfeiture of Conveyances for Simple Possession of Marijuana,
1974 Utah L. Rev. 871.

CHAPTER 37a
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Section
58-37a-l. Short title.
58-37a-2. Purpose.
58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined.
58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is drug paraphernalia.
58-37a-5. J^JaJK&l-ftets.
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights.
58-37a-l.' Short title. This c h a p t e r shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act."
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to controlled substances
providing that it is unlawful to use, possess
with intent to use, or deliver any drug pai*aphernalia; providing guidelines for determining whether a particular object is drug para-

phernalia; providing for civil and criminal
penalties; and providing an-effective date. —
Laws 1981, ch. 76.
^ a w Revjews#
*. ^
,
1/irwr
ktah Legislative Survey - i981, I9a2 Utah
L. Rev. 125, 149.

58-37a-2. Purpose. It is the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of narcotics by eliminating paraphernalia designed for processing, ingesting, or otherwise
using a controlled substance.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 2.
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Cite a* 52( l\:d 1)17

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
ONE (I) PORSCHE 2-DOOR, I.D. NO.
911211026, TITLE NO. PPI0026F BEARING KANSAS LICENSE PLATE NO.
JOR 1652, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 13495.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sopt. IS, 1^74.

Appeal by State from denial by the
Seventh District Court, Grand County, Edward Sheya, J„ of petition for forfeiture
of automobile which was seized when its
owner was arrested for possession of one
ounce of marijuana. The Supreme Court,
Henriod, JM held that forfeiture of automobile could not be accomplished under
statute providing that all conveyances used
or intended for use to transport, or in any
manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of all
controlled substances in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act, are forfeitable,
in that the statute pertains to transportation to accomplish possession, not simply
transportation "with" possession.
Affirmed.
Crockett, J., dissented with opinion in
which EUctt, ].. concurred.
1. Drugs and Narcotics C=> 181
The primary and sole purpose of statute providing that all conveyances used or
intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act are forfeitable was
directed exclusively towards the transportation of a controlled substance for distribution according to erstwhile law merchant principles, and not for personal possession and consumption. U.C.A.1953, 5837-13(l)(e).
2. Drugs and Narcotics C=> 191
Automobile could not be forfeited under statute providing that all conveyances

used or intended for use to transport or in
any manner facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
controlled substances in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act, except if subject to a bona fide security interest, are
forfeitable when its owner was arrested
for possession of one ounce of marijuana
in that forfeiture under the statute would
have been unconscionable since the statute
pertains to transportation to accomplish
possession,
not
simply
transportation
"with" possession.
U.C.A.1953, 58-3713(l)(e).

Vernon B. Rommey, Atty. Gen., M. Reid
Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,"
for plaintiff and appellant.
Gerald 11. Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
' H E N R I O D , Justice:
One Price, owner of a Porsche automobile, valued at ? 10,000, was stopped and arrested for speeding, possession of a controlled substance and driving while under
the influence of alcohol. He was charged
with possession. There is nothing in the
record to indicate what disposition was
made of that charge.
Nonetheless, after the arrest and apparently before the charge was filed, the car
was turned over to the State for forfeiture.
The section of the statute under which
this forfeiture was accomplished, Title 5837-13(1 We), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
either is invalid or inapplicable under the
facts of this case for the following reasons :
The section mentioned reads as follows:
(e) All conveyances including aircraft,
vehicles or vessels used or intended foj
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

918

Utah

526 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

described in ( l ) ( a ) or (1)(b) of this
section, except that:
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance
subject to a bona fide security interest
shall be subject to the interest of the
secured party upon the party's showing
he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take place in the use of
the conveyance.
I. The section, as applied to this case
leads to an unusually harsh result, constitutes an additional fine or penalty in connection with a misdemeanor—that of possession of marijuana. Jt is conceded that
basis of the charge is that one ounce of
marijuana was being carried by Price, who
was a university student in Lawrence,
Kansas. But it is undisputed that his sole
purpose for being in Utah was to visit the
Arches National Monument,—not to transport a controlled substance. It appears
that the thrust of the section mentioned
above is to deter the transportation of a
controlled substance from one place to another and has nothing to do with a situation where the controlled substance,—one
ounce of marijuana in this case,—simply in
a car but possessed by a person incident to
a vacation and only incident and collateral
to transportation and obviously for personal consumption, is involved. It seems unthinkable that one would package up an
ounce of marijuana for the primary purpose of transporting it five hundred to a
\. 46 Utah 307. 151 P. 353 (1015); Morgan
v. Sorenson, 3 Ctah 2d 42.S, 2.S0 P.2d 22!)
(1055); Sehletfel v. Iloiitfli. 1*2 Or. 441,
1.S0 P.2d 51(1. 1S.S p.2d 15,S (1047); Miller
v. Stuart, 00 Ctah 250, 253 P. 000 (1027).
2. Title O.S-3-2, Ctah Coile Annotate! 1053,
seems to be apropos under Hie facts of this
rase. See also: Spoon-Shaeket v. County
of Oakland, 350 Mich. 151. 07 X.\V.2d 25
(1050); State v. Hunt, 13 I'tah 2d 32, 30S
I\2d 201 (1002): Stanton v. Davis, 0 Cf,ih
2d 1S4, 341 I\2d 207 (1050).
3. "The decision of the trial court should he
affirmed if it is correct, although
(it)
. . relied upon a wrong ground
or gave a wrong reason." 5 Am.Jur.2d, Sec.

thousand miles for sale, receipt, possession
or concealment.
This whole case leads to an unconscionable forfeiture, and that the trial court was
correct in concluding that the enormity of
the forfeiture hardly could fit the $299
misdemeanor.
That forfeitures are frowned upon needs
citation of but few authorities since the
cases supporting such an elementary principle are legion. In Moran v. Knights of
Columbus, 1 our court had this to say as to
forfeitures:
It matters not . . . whether the
action is one in equity or one at law;
the rules of equity
. . .
must
prevail/*
It is no answer for appellant to urge
that the court's interpretation of the statute was erroneous,—if the decision of the
court is supported by good and sufficient
reason or reasons. 3
II. The statute must be examined in the
light of its purpose and/or intent of the
legislature.
In State Land Board v. State Department of Fish and Game, 4 we said:
. . with respect to the meaning
of statutes, it is appropriate to look to
the intended purpose and to the means of
accomplishing it by the proper application of the language used.
[1] It appears obvious that the primary
and sole purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature were directed exclu7S5, p. 227. See also: Tree v. White, 110
Utah 233, 171 P.2d 30S (1040); Ila-ue v.
Xephi Jrr. Co., 10 Utah 421, 52 P. 705:
Piper v. Kakle, 7S Ctah 342, 2 I\2d 0(>0
(1031); Harris v. Putler. 01 Utah 11, 03
l\2d 2S0 (1030); Limb \. Fed. Milk Prod.
Ass'n, 23 Ctah 2d 222, 401 P.2d 200 (1000) ;
In He Love's Estate, 75 I'tah 342, 2S5 P.
200 (1030) ; Thomas v. Foultfcr, 71 Ctah 274,
204 P. 075 (102S).
4. 17 Ctah 2d 237, 4ON p.2d 707 (1005). See
also: AiiilniH v. Allred, 17 Ctah 2d 100, 404
P.2d 072 (1005); Snyder v. Chine. 15 Ctah
2d 254. 300 I\2d 015 (1004) : Younjr v. Harney, 20 Ctah 2d 1 0 \ 433 P.2d 840-(1007).
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sivcly toward the transportation of a controlled substance for distribution according
to erstwhile law merchant principles, and
not for personal possession and consumption.
Let's look at the statute which points
strictly to transportation, not mere possession. It says: "All cuwcyanccs [connoting transportation] including aircraft, vehicles or vessels [connoting transportation]
used or intended for use, to transport [connoting transportation], or in any manner
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property
. except . . . " are forfeitable.
[Emphasis added.]
[2] The statute's theme song has lyrics
that require the sheet music to be prefaced
by a title such as "Transportation."
It
seems that the word "possession" mentioned in the section obviously must have
an end result from asportation, the gravamen of the legislation, as does the word
"concealment."
Grammatically,
hardly
could it be said that knowingly "possession" of an ounce of marijuana by the
Captain on the deck of "Old Ironsides," in
Boston Harbor, would subject that vessel
to forfeiture if the venerable warrior were
dry-docked there or in a harbor operated
by a ship museum buff at Great Salt Lake.
The statute is transportation to accomplish
possession,
not
simply ' transportation
"with" possession,—where the obvious purpose of the statute is an interdiction
against transportation for the accomplishment of distribution throtigh pushers,
pimps or pirates,—not to accomplish a forfeiture because one has a marijuana cigarette in his pocket or mouth, headed for
Disneyland,—or Arches National Monu-

5. ^r^ \:u\\\ 101. -v.n

I\LM

012

(RMK).

6. State v. Salt Lake City Rd. of Ed., K* I t ah
2d f>0, 'M\S P.2d 4US (1902) ; Crist v. Rishop.
r t i i h . f>20 P.2d 100 (1074) ; Parker v. Hampton, 2 * I'tnh 2d 30, 4i>7 P.2d K4N (1072) :
Howe v. .Jackson. IS Vt<\\\ 2d 200. 421 P.2d
150 (1000).
7. Jolmnson v. Cudahy, 107 Ptah 114, 152 I\
2d O.S (1044), where we said: " . . . we
are cognizant, of the fact that we are not

mcnt. The Title in Chapter 145, page 475,
Laws of Utah 1971, seems to bear me out
on this conclusion, as do the authorities.
In Masich v. U. S. Smelting 5 we said:
One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will
look to the reason, spirit, and sense of
the legislation, as indicated by the entire
context and subject matter of the statute
dealing with the subject. 0
III. The statute obviously can lead to
the most absurd results,—a reason this
court consistently has pointed up as a valid
reason for invalidation of a statute, or a
refusal to apply it under particular facts
making such application ridiculous. 1 This
case is such a case, and it is suggested that
possession of an ounce of marijuana, the
purpose of which is personal consumption,
—with incidental transportation for such
purpose,—is not trafficking in dope, which
is the evil that the statute obviously is designed to eliminate. Under the legislation,
Trice would have to forfeit his $10,01)0
Porsche if he happened to be sitting in it
in his driveway in silence and serenity,
smoking a marijuana cigarette, and was
approached by a gendarme, who took his
car out from under him. Under this statute he could have his car taken from him
if he were taking his six-year old to school
and happened to have a marijuana cigarette in his pocket,—or under such circumstances he was rushing his pregnant wife
to the hospital,—or if he were driving the
Porsche out of a burning garage,—or
trying to escape from a highwayman or a
flood or anything else. All of these, if
bases for forfeiture, in my opinion would
give birth to a very serious constitutional
question as to the statute's application
following the literal wording of the .statute,
hut such is not required when to do MO would
defeat legislative intent ami make the statute absurd. In this regard see Robinson v.
Union Pacific K. To., 70 Ptah 441, 201 P.
0 ; Rrackett v. Chamberlain, 115 Me. fttf, OS
A. WW; Nichols v. Logan, 1S4 Ky. 711, 213
SAW i s l . " Masich v. P. S. Smelting, supra,
footnote 5 ; Rowley v. Pub. Serv. Tomm., 112
Vtah 110, ISO l\2d f>14 (11M7).
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being" offensive to the due process clause
or equal protection clause.
IV. The exception to the statute devours it. Section 13(l)(e), Chapter 145,
Laws of Utah 1971 (Title
5&-37-l3(l)(c)
Utah Code Annotated 1953), has three
sub-subsections: (i) excepts common carriers, (ii) owner having no knowledge of
contraband in his ''conveyance," and (iii)
excepts from forfeiture any such "conveyance" where the owner has a security interest in it, and did not know of any unlawful use thereof. This section might be
dubbed the "finance" or "bank" or "loan
shark" section. This is the section that
makes the statute silly and amounts to inverse discrimination,—-a discrimination in
favor of a "mortgagee." Such a mortgagee and the conveyance are protected. Jt
seems that if Price had borrowed a bona
fide $8,000 from a bank or finance company, the Porsche would not have been subject to forfeiture, Price could have retained possession, gone to Arches National
Monument, smoked marijuana all the way,
returned to Lawrence, Kansas, gone backto school, unfettered, in his PorscheT and
paid off the loan at his leisure or according to the terms of his loan, ff he were
driving a leased car, as thousands of people do these days rather than to buy one,
such conveyance could not be forfeited under this statute. Neither would it be so
subject if he rented a car from Hertz, or
Avis, or U-1 laid. Neither would it be subject to forfeiture if he borrowed the car
from his brother or wife, or if he stoic it,
or temporarily converted it, or sold it the
day he left Lawrence in exchange for a
promissory note, with permission to drive
to Utah.
The most that can be said for this statute's efficacy or practical worth, much less
its validity, was said in 1967, when the
California legislature repealed its legislation on forfeiture of vehicles used in violation of narcotics laws. Jn California Statutes 1967, Chapter 280, Section 1, page
1437, "Urgency," the legislature had this to
say :

The Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy,
in a report dated December 12, 1966,
stated that the people of this state will
save at least six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000) each year if the motor
vehicle forfeiture provisions of the
Health and Safety Code are abolished.
The report further stated that such provisions have had No Deterrent
Effect.
In order to immediately effectuate the
annual savings to the state of such a
great sum of money, and in order to enable numerous personnel of the Bureau
of Narcotic Enforcement to redirect
their efforts toward the enforcement of
laws which have real influence as deterrents to illegal narcotic activities, it is
necessary that this act go into immediate
effect.
The moral of this story if- this case
should be reversed would be interesting
mostly and primarily to the pusher, and to
him who makes a business of trafficking in
and transporting contraband.
It then
would be simple: If you buy a car in
which you want to transport marijuana for
consume an ounce yourself on the way to
the Arches), make sure the bank or loan
company has your note and chattel mortgage, or just borrow a car. or lease one, or
rent one, and you will have transportation
throughout Utah free and clear of forfeiture and without any concern whatever
that you will be prohibited either from
owning or driving it.
The trial court's judgment should be and
is sustained.
C A L L I S T E R . C . J., and TUCKETT, J.,
concur.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting).
It is indisputably clear from the evidence
that Donald Price, the owner of thisPorsche sedan, was knowingly transporting
in it considerable quantities of illicit drugs:
marijuana and amphetamine pills; and
that they were discovered and seized in
connection with his lawful arrest. The
Highway Patrol officers had followed this
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car, clocking its speed at 9? to 100 miles
per hour. The arresting officer, William
Pcctol, testified that at the time of the arrest he ohserved in the car in an open sack
plastic hags containing what appeared to
he marijuana; and also ohserved different
kinds of pills.
The amounts of these suhstances is not
expressly stated. IUit it is clear that the
one ounce of marijuana which was tested
had no relationship whatsoever to the total
quantities of illicit drills found in the car.
Informative on this point are certain excerpts from the record. Officer Pcctol
said that after lie had informed Mr. Price
that he was under arrest and "read him his
rights from the card" :
O.

What did you do then?

A. 1 laid all the stuff containing contents oi the sack on the hood of the patrol car and asked him if he could identify it and asked him if the other two passenders knew what was in the vehicle.
And he stated no, that the marijuana
was his, and / asked him if he could
identify tlie pills and he said they are
amphetamines.
(). Xow from that teli me what you
did in petting the samples?
A. We dumped all of the contents on
the desk in the patrol office. Took a
sample of marijuana and placed it in a
plastic hap and taped it up, placed it inside of the yellow envelope. Wrote on
the sample 1, my case numher and what
the sample was containing. Sealed that
envelope, taped it and initialed it, ami we
did this to each of the different colored
pills.
Q. That was sent in to the state, toxicologist?
A. Yes.
Also pertinent to this point is a statement of° the trial court with reference to
the proffered evidence. In speaking of the
officer's testimony he stated in part:
he testified that there were a
numher of plastic bags and I just can't
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assume that what is in that hag is marijuana
. . . .
*
*
*
* . *
*
I mean / can infer from
what you said / can make a reasonable
inference, hut 1 don't think it is established to the point that 1 can receive it
in evidence as marijuana. Without having been tested. When all he says is he
suspects that it is. He took out some
and they say that was marijuana, but 1
don't feel warranted in making an as
sumption to the point where I will admit
it in evidence as marijuana upon merely
his suspicion. 1 think 1 have got all of
the mileage you can get out of it when
he (Officer PeetoU says he took some
out and proved to be marijuana and here
is the report that is in evidence.
O. As I recall, there were two plastic
bags?
A. Yes, I believe there were two.
Concerning the matter of forfeiture in
his memorandum decision the trial court
referred to the car as being of great value,
$10,000 which he regarded as greatly disproportionate to the penalty for the crime.
(The main opinion speaks of a fine of
$209. Hut there is also the more important
penalty of up to six months in jail )
Moreover, it is to be noted that Section
3SU^7_S, U.C.A.l°o3, which provides for
the penalties for the possession of marijuana, further provides in subsection 58-37S(S) :
Any penalty imposed for violation cf
this section shall be in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative
penalty or sanction authorized by law.
The important proposition to be noted on
this appeal is that the only reason given by
the trial court for his refusal to declare
the. forfeiture of the automobile was that
he thought that its value (the only evidence
concerning value was Price's statement
that he had paid $10,0nn for it) was so disproportionate to the penalty for the offense of possession of marijuana that the
forfeiture should not be enforced. In that

52b P.2d—58Va
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connection he s t a t e d : ' T h i s court does not
believe that the legislature intended such a
harsh and d r a s t i c r e s u l t / ' i. e.f the forfeiture.
T h e proposition stated by the trial j u d g e
g i v e s rise.to two t h o u g h t s :
First, that the j u d g e j u s t couldn't believe
the legislature meant w h a t is so clearly
said in t h e statutes.
Second, that if a person is c a u g h t t r a n s p o r t i n g d r u g s in an old beat-up inexpensive
car, it is subject to forfeiture. But if he is
more p r o s p e r o u s in his traffic, and has a
fine new expensive car, the law should not
deign to forfeit it.
T h e trial j u d g e was patently r i g h t w h e n
he said *'I can m a k e a reasonable inference." T h a t is, that the rest of t h e substance was also m a r i j u a n a . It is totally inconceivable to me that the officer could
pick' up one ounce of substance, all of
which had t h e same a p p e a r a n c e , which
would t u r n otit to be m a r i j u a n a , and the
rest of it be something else. J t h e r e f o r e
say with complete a s s u r a n c e that the only
reasonable inference was that the e n t i r e
q u a n t i t y was m a r i j u a n a .
I add, however,
that the issue of forfeiture under the statute, depends only upon the identification of
some substantial and identifiable a m o u n t of
m a r i j u a n a , and not upon any p a r t i c u l a r
q u a n t i t y thereof.
It is to be remembered that t h e forfeit u r e of property declared by law is not the
same as imposing a sentence for a crime,
with respect to which the trial court does
1. As to the grunt of general power to the
courts to suspend sentences or grant probation in criminal cases see Sec. 77-35—17, I*.
C.A.10."tf.
2. Cases sustaining the principle of forfeiture
as a means of law enforcement are numerous".
K. g.. for similar cases of forfeiture see Associated Investment Company v. United States,
220 F.2d N.S5 (5th Cir. 1955); two smoked
marijuana cigarettes in the vehicle resulted
in forfeiture; (Jerieral Finance Corporation
of Florida South v. United Status, XY.\ F.2d
6X1 (5th Cir. 1004) :. State v. Meyers, 32N
S.\V.2d .'321 (Tex.Civ.App.Ul5!)) ; Cunnichael
Finance Company v. State, 175 S.\V.2d o*1i?
(Tex.Civ.App.1071) ; I'rinee George's County

h a v e some discretion in modifying or susp e n d i n g the sentence. 1 T h e d e c l a r a t i o n of
forfeiture of p r o p e r t y u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
so j u s t i f y i n g is the m a n d a t e of the people,
speaking t h r o u g h their legislature.
When
such a m a n d a t e is expressed in clear a n d
u n a m b i g u o u s t e r m s , it is the d u t y of t h e
court to abide thereby and c a r r y out its
m a n d a t e , t h u s a v o i d i n g judicial i n t r u s i o n s
into the legislative p r e r o g a t i v e . 2
T h e principle of forfeiture of t h e m e a n s
of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a s a method of law enforcement and control of illicit t r a f f i c in
c o n t r a b a n d w a s discussed and reviewed by
the United S t a t e s S u p r e m e Court in the recent case of Calero-Toieclo v. P e a r s o n
Yacht l e a s i n g Co. 3 T h a t principle w a s
r e a f f i r m e d in a situation greatly m o r e exa g g e r a t e d t h a n the instant one. A f t e r officers had discovered m a r i j u a n a a b o a r d ,
the y a c h t was seized and forfeited p u r s u ant to P u e r t o Rican statutes. 4
The Sup r e m e C o u r t rejected the attack upon the
p r o c e d u r e and the s t a t u t e s ; and p a r t i c u l a r ly rejected the contention of deprivation of
p r o p e r t y without due process of law u n d e r
t!ie F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t .
It is notew o r t h y that o u r Utah statute is m o r e fair
t h a n . ilic. one under attack in the• C a l e r o T o l e d o case, in t h a t u n d e r our s t a t u t e the
o w n e r is given the opportunity to show his
innocence and his interest will be p r o t e c t ed.
W i t h respect to the California e x p e r i ence r e f e r r e d to in the main opinion, this
should be n o t e d : their stature w a s not d e v. One (I) 1000 Opel, et nl.. 207 Md. 401,
208 A .2d 10X; State v. One 1007 Ford Mustang, 200 Md. 275, 202 A.2d 04. S«M- discussion in the latter rase wherein the Maryland
Court of Appeals said, inter alia, that the
refusal to -declare the forfeiture would be
"comparable to refusal to enter a large judgment against a debtor becausi* it would place
a great burden upon the defendant.
3. 410 U.S. 0(>;i, 04 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 4~>2
(1074).
4. Puerto Kico Laws Ann.
2512(a)(4), which has the
the present Ctaii Statute,
( l ) ( e ) , U.S.C.A.1053, but
tions.
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Citensfii:L«
elated unconstitutional. It was repealed by ment of fair value would be solely within
their legislature, 5 after a study by the discretion of trustees, and that trial co.urt
Commission on State Government, and ap- properly adopted value placed upon stock
parently largely because of economic con- by trustees and accountant.
siderations. I appreciate that the reason is
Affirmed.
quite immaterial here. But the experience
itself is in conformity with the idea herein
1. Trusts C=>2I7.4
advocated: that whatever the problem may
Trust agreement, which authorized
be, it should be dealt with legislatively trustees to purchase assets of settlor's esrather than judicially.
tate at fair value and provided that proprieIn accordance with what I have said ty of purchase, amount of assets purchased
above, it is my judgment that the order of
ami ascertainment of fair value would be
forfeiture should be entered as prescribed solely within discretion of trustees, authoby law. ( All emphasis added.)
rized trustees to use portion of trust estate
to purchase stock in certain corporations
RLLKTT, J., concurs in the dissenting which had been owned and controlled by
opinion of CROCKKTT, J.
settlor and his wife. U.C.A.1953, 33^2-1,
33-2-2.
2. Trusts C=>2I7.3(5)
:

7

MY NuM6f« SiS

David Lawrence DIPO. Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v,
Doris D, DIPO and Gcorgo L. Dlpo,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 13490.

Supreme Court of I'tnli.
Sept: 10, 1<>74.

Beneficiary of trust sought to enjoin
trustees from using portion of trust estate
to purchase stock in certain corporations
which had been owned or controlled by settlor and his wife, one of the trustees. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Jay \i. Banks, J., dismissed the complaint
and the beneficiary appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held that proposed purchase of assets was authorized by
trust agreement, which authorized trustees
to purchase assets of settlor's estate- and
which provided that propriety of purchase,
amount of assets purchased and ascertain-

Terms of trust, unless illegal or
against public policy, govern over such
statutes as the "prudent man" statute with
regard to investment of trust funds. U.C.
A.l<>?3, 33-2-2.
3. Trusts 0 2 6 2

Testimony of settlor's insurance adviser that one of the main purposes of settlor's purchase of life policies and creation
of trust by settlor was to enable settlor's
estate to pay inheritance taxes without necessity of liquidating corporations was not
inadmissible on ground that it was hearsay
in action to enjoin trustees, following
death of settlor, from using trust estate derived from life policies to purchase stock
in corporations which had been owned or
controlled by settlor and his wife.
4. Trusts C=>263

In action instituted by beneficiary of
trust to enjoin trustees from using portion
of trust estate to purchase-stock in corporations which had been owned or controlled by settlor and his wife, trial court
properly adopted value which had been
placed upon the stock by trustees and accountant who did not take into consideration claimed discount in value dvx to fact
that stock was closely held.

5. California Statutes 11)07, Ch. 2S<J. See. 3, p. 1438.
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John T. Caine of
PICIIAPDS, CAINE &. RICHARDS
Attorney for Joe -Arave
2 5'"^ Washington Boulevard
Ogdon, Utah'844 01
Telephone: 399-4191

IN ':\\Y. DISTRICT C0U>T
COUNTY Or CACHE, STATE OF UTA-i
STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

1983 PONTIAC,
Defendant."

Civil No. 23241-

:
:

. ' - . ' !

This matter having come on for trial before the Honorable
VeNcy Christoffersen on February 8, 1985.

The plaintiff was

\
i

represented by Deputy Cache County Attorney, James Jenkins, and
the owner of the 198 3 Pontiac, Joe Arave, was present and

I
\

represented by his attorney, John T. Caine, and the court having j
heard the testimony of the witnesses and being fully advised in

:

the premise, now makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:

I
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

;

That Joe Arave i-s the owner of a 1983 black Pontiac

Firebird, serial number 1G2A587H7DL213190, and the value of said j
automobile is approximately $10,000.
2.

That the automobile was used by the owner, Joe Arave,

who, on two different occasions, utilized the vehicle for .the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

transportation of a small quantity of cocaine". <:,,Vthough ther^ :.*•
no evidence that any profit motive-was -'involved end it is.
questionable whether the cocaine was for sale- or merely

•-":

possession for his own use and- for the use of someone he thought
was his friend.
3.

That there was no perfected security interest in the

vehicle but the vehicle had been rebuilt utilizing money loaned
from Zionfs Bank pursuant to a loan agreement that required his
father's guarantee.

This was an arrangement that had been in

effect for two and one-half years.

Arave had been in the

business of buying cars and fixing them for resale and this was
the procedure he utilized to secure vehicles which he would then
resale and pay off the bank loans.

If the car is forfeited, the

person who is penalized would not be the defendant, Arave, but
either the bank or his father.
4.

That the value of the vehicle, if forfeited to the

state, is disproportionate to the use of the vehicle for the.
transportation of a controlled substance.
5.

That the state filed it's complaint for forfeiture on

September 20, 1984, and an answer was filed on October 18, 1984. i
I
The matter was not set for a hearing until February 8, 1985,
which exceeded the twenty day requirement of §58-36-13,, Utah Code
-Annotated (1553).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .
1.

From the foregoing findings of fact, and considering the

totality of all the circumstances, the court concludes that the
above described vehicle should net be forfeited to the state
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_3-

pursuant to §58-37-13 Utah Code Annotated
2.

(1953, an tender" ' ,

That the 1983 Pontiac Firebird is to be inimrsdic-.tul'-.

returned to Joe ;-.rave, the registered owner.

That 3.f v.lv: i-ta*1.-.-

chooses to appeal this order, that Arave will maintain c^T 1 is.i r-r.
insurance on said vehicle in an amount of $10,000 and will ru.•sell, encumber, trade, or in any other way hypothecate iJ- o«-r:.ng
the pendency of said appeal unless by order of the court;.
DATED this

day of February, 1935.
BY THE COURT:

VeMOY CHRISTOFFERSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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John T. Caine of
R^HARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
7r-:_orney for Joe Arave
?5o Q Washington Boulevard
Ogaen, Ital "'#4 4 01
Tivlef hone: 3 9 9-4191
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF U, > •:
ST-TL OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff
Civil No. 23241
vs .
198 3 PONTIAC,
Defendant,
This matter having come on for trial before the Honorable
VeNoy Christoffersen on February 8, 1985.

The plaintiff was

represented by Deputy Cache County Attorney, James Jenkins, and
the owner of the 1983 Pontiac, Joe Arave, was present and
represented by his attorney, John T. Caine, and the court having
heard the testimony of the witnesses and being fully advised in
the premise, and the court having heretofore entered its findings
of fact and conclusions of law, now enters the following order;
1.

That the complaint for forfeiture to the state be and is

hereby dismissed.
2.

That the 1983 Pontiac Firebird, serial number

IG2A587H7DL213190, be forthwith returned to the registered owner,
Joe Arave.

That if the state chooses to appeal this order, that

Arave will maintain collision insurance on said vehicle in an
—mT
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amount of $10,000 and will not sell, encumber, trade, or in any

..T)

,_

CO
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.other .way hypothecate it during the pendency
unless by order of the

:\. : n rv

court,

DATED this _____ day of February, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSON
DISTRICT COURT JliDGE
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